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Patterns of controlling ownership stakes differ  controlling shareholder.
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I.  Introduction
Much of the  literature  on the role  and function  of the modemn firm is based  on the
assumption  of  the  prevalence  of  widely  dispersed  ownership.  The  dispersion  of
ownership has resulted in the notion that "the awner  of industrial wealth is left a mere
symbol of ownership" (Berle and Means, 1932, p.68), as the control over companies is
being transferred to professional managers.  The literature on corporate govermance  often
starts from this principal-agent relarioiiship and its associated problems. This notion, and
the  following corporate  governance  literature,  originally  derives  from  the  Berle  and
Means study which concluded that almost half of large American corporations did not
have  a  single owner  who  controlled more  than  20%  of  the  stock.  It  has  also  been
propagated by  Baurnol (1959),  Jensen and  Mecking  (1976)  and  Grossman and  Hart
(1980), among others.
A more recent line of the empinical literatu  re fmds results whhich  are at odds with
this  traditional  assumption.  Deemsetz (1983),  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1986),  Morck,
Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1988) have  shown  that  som.e concentration  of  ownership  and
control exists even among the largest American corporations. La Porta et al. (1998) find
even larger concentration  of  control in  a  cross-section of  developed  anid developing
countries.  They also point to  a number of  country-specific studies that document the
existence of large ownership stakes. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) is
the first study that investigates the important issue of ultimate control, i.e., they trace the
chain of ownership to find who has the most voting rights.  Their findings suggest that
ownership is largely concentrated in the hands of families ard  the state even in some of
the most developed countries.  The concentration of ownership is enhanced tloough the
use of pyramid structures. deviations from one-share-one-vote rales, cross-holdings, and
the appointment of managers and directors who are related to the controlling family.
East Asian corporations have already long been considered to be an exception to
the  notion  of  widely-held  ownership  (Faukuyam  a,  1996;  Rajan  and  Zingales,  1998),
although more recent research (La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes5 and Shleifer,  1998) shows
that most developing and  some developed  countries have similar  degree of ownership
concentration. The degree to which  ownership is concentrated  in  East Asian countries
2has,  however,  not  been  documented  on  a  systematic,  cross-country  basis.  This  is
puzzling, as East Asia provides  the largest diversity of economic development of any
region in the world - the richest country (Japan) has a per-capita income that is forty
times  higher  than  that  of  the  poorest  country  (Indonesia).  The  differences  in  the
economic,  and  the  ensuing  legal  and  institutional  structures  across  the  East  Asian
countries provide us with the unique opportunity to study the relation between the level
of development of a country and the prevailing ownership patterns.
We use the methodology  developed in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer
(1998) to investigate ultimate control patterns in 2,980 publicly traded companies in nine
East  Asian  countries  (Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Korea  (South),  Malaysia,  the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand).  We find large family control in more than
half of East Asian corporations.  Significant cross-country differences do exist, however.
Corporations in  Japan,  for  example, are generally widely-held,  while  corporations  in
Indonesia and Thailand are mainly family-controlled.  And state-control is significant in
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
We also  find that  smaller  firms  are more  likely  family-controlled,  as  are older
firms. In many countries, control is enhanced through pyramid structures, and some-tinmes
deviations from one-share-one-vote rules, and voting rights consequently exceed forrnal
cash-flow  rights.  Separation  of  management  from  ownership  control  is  rare,  and
management of two-third of firms which are not widely-held  is related to the family of
the  controlling  shareholder.  Patterns  of  controlling  ownership  stakes  differ  across
countries, and ownership concentration generally diminishes with the level of economic
and  institutional  development.  This  negative  association  suggests  that  companies
gravitate towards less concentrated control as their countries become wealthier.
The evidence also suggests that in each country ultimate control of the corporate
sector rests in the hands of a small number of families.  At the extreme, 16.6% and 17.1%
of total market capitalization in Indonesia and the Philippines respectively can be traced
to the ultimate control of a single family (the Suhartos and the Ayalas).  The largest ten
families in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand control half of the corporate sector
(in terms of market  capitalization), while the largest ten  families in  Hong Kong  and
Korea control about a third of the corporate sector. The exception is Japan where family
control is insignificant.
3Our findings shed some light on the viability of corporate governance structures in
East Asia. Insider-control may also have contributed to the weak performance and risky
investment of many East Asian corporations prior to the 1997-98 financial crisis. Legal
and regulatory developments may have been impeded by the concentration of corporate
wealth  and  the  tight  links  between  corporations  and  government,  either  directly  or
indirectly  The endogeneity of the legal systems implies that the legal  and regulatory
reform  in. most  East  Asian  countries  will  likely  not  be  independent  of  changes  in
ownership structures and wealth concentration.
The paper  is organized  as follows. Section II reviews  the relevant  literature on
control of East Asian corporations.  Section III discusses the construction  of the data,
develops the methodology of calculating ultimate control, and shows several examples of
ultimate control through various pyramid structures.  Section IV details the basic results,
and investigates the within-country and differences in the concentration of control and the
means of  enhancing  control.  Section V  studies the  cross-country  differences  in  the
concentration of control using regression analysis.  Section VI revisits the issue of family
control and draws some implications for the evolution of legal frameworks in East Asian
countries.  Section VII concludes.
II.  Control  Structures  in East  Asia
While numerous  scholars  have examined the performance of  East Asian  corporations
over  the  last  four  decades,'  their  control  structure  and  relationship  to  corporate
performance remains largely unknown.  Several studies on corporate governance in Japan
(Aoki, 1990; Nishiyama,  1984; Prowse,  1992; Hoshi, Kashyap, and  Scharfstein,  1991;
Kaplan, 1994) point to the significance of keiretsu groups. These studies focus, however,
on company performance while accounting for the influence of business groups, and do
not attempt to trace the ownership of each company to its ultimate owners and identify
those owners by type and control stake.  The exception is Lim (1981) who studies in
detail the control structures of the largest hundred corporations  in Malaysia, using the
Berle and Means (1932) methodology.
There does exist, however, a number of case studies  which  describe the control
structures of some of the largest business groups in East Asian countries: Taylor (1992)
4for the Li Ka-shing group in Hong Kong, Sato (1993) for the Salim group in Indonesia,
Okumura  (1993)  for  the  Mitsubishi  group  in  Japan,  Taniura  (1993)  for  the  Lucky
Goldstar group in Korea, Koike (1993) for the Ayala group in the Philippines, Numazaki
(1993) for the Tainanbang group and Taniura (1989) for the Formosa group in Taiwan,
Suehiro (1993) for the Charoen Pokphand group, and Vatikiotis (1997) for the Dhanin
Chearavanont group in Thailand.
These studies provide us with some insights into the evolution and peculiarities of
corporate  control  in  East Asia.  In particular,  most  of  these papers  suggest  that  the
dominance of most business groups lies in the privileges that they could solicit from the
government: exclusive exporting or importing rights, protection from foreign competition
for extensive periods  of time,  including the granting of monopoly power  in the  local
market, procurement of large government contracts, etc. The case-study literature does
not, however, allow for cross-country comparisons; neither does it provide evidence on
the existence of state ownership, as the focus is on particular families and their business
empires.  In some cases, the literature also does not document the precise mechanisms
through which the ultimate owners are able to exercise and extend their control.
The recent contributions of La Porta et al. (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silarnes,
and Shleifer (1998) go some way towards filling this gap in our knowledge.  The former
study documents the ownership structure of the ten largest non-financial corporations for
a  cross-section of 49 countries, including nine East Asian countries. The results  show
that  although  ownership  concentration  of  East  Asian  corporations  is  high,  it  is  not
significantly different  from that  in  other countries  at similar  levels of  economic  and
institutional  development.  The  latter  study  investigates  in  great  detail  the  control
structure of the largest twenty publicly traded corporations in 27 rich countries, including
four (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore) East Asian countries.  It traces controL  to
the ultimate  owners of each company and  distinguishes among five types  of owners.
Ownership in the majority of Japanese and Korean corporations is found to be widely
dispersed,  corporations in Hong Kong are predominantly controlled by families, wlile
about half of the sampled companies in Singapore are controlled by the state.
See  Young  (1995),  Amsden  and Singh  (1994),  and Rodrik  (1997)  for surveys  of the literature.
5La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) also examines the means through
which control is enhanced.  The study shows that owners extend their resources through
the use of pyramiding and management appointments, as well as through frequent cross-
ownership  and  the  use  (less  frequently)  of  shares  that  have  more  votes.  Another
interesting  pattern  is  also  documented:  control  of  East  Asian  corporations  can  be
achieved with  significantly  less than  an  absolute majority  share  of the  stock,  as the
probability of being a single controlling owner through holding only 20% (or more) of
the stock is very high-above  80% across the four East Asian countries.
The previous research leaves unanswered several questions.  First, are there any
differences in the patterns and distribution of control across the East Asian countries,
including  less  developed  ones?  Second,  are  there  within-country  differences  in  the
concentration and distribution of control? Third, do within-country differences depend on
size or age of the corporation?  Fourth, to what extent is corporate control concentrated in
the hands of particular families and is the relation between business and government very
strong? Finally, if such differences in ultimate ownership exist across countries, what are
their determinants?  The answers to some of these questions have strong implications for
the  level  of  transparency,  openness  and  market-based  transactions  in  East  Asian
economies.
III.  Construction of the data
The  analysis  in  the  following  sections  is  based  on  newly-assembled  data  for  2,980
publicly-traded  corporations  (including  both  financial  institutions  and  non-financial
institutions)  in  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Korea,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  As our starting point in the data collection, we use the
Worldscope database which generally provides the names and holdings of  large owners.
Worldscope has over 8,000 publicly-traded firms in the nine East Asian countries, but
only 2,300 companies provide detailed ownership information.  We supplement the data
with information from the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the Japan Company
Handbook  1999 (1998), the  1997 Annual Reports  of the Hong Kong,  Jakarta, Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the
Korean  Fair  Trade  Commission,  the  Securities  Exchange  of  Thailand  Companies
6Handbook (1998), and the  Singapore Investment Guide (1998).2  We  exclude 852
companies  across  the nine countries  which  have proxy ownership  that cannot  be traced  to
a specific  owner.  In all cases,  we collect  the ownership  structure  as of December  1996 or
the end of the 1996 accounting  year.  We end up with 2,980 companies  for which have
complete  ownership  information  and where  we can trace the ultimate  owners.
The coverage  of the sample does not differ significantly  across the nine countries,
as  shown in  Table  1.  Typically, we  cover  about three-quarters of  total  market
capitalization  even though the share  of firms  in our sample relative  to the total number of
listed firms is sometimes  (Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand) less than 50%.  This is
because  we always  cover the largest  hundred  firms in terms of market capitalization,  i.e.,
the average  firm in our sample  is larger than  the average  listed firrn  on the stock  markelt.
Following on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer (1998), we analyze the
control  pattern of companies  by studying all ultimate shareholders  who control over t'en
percent of the votes. We also use a twenty  percent cut-off  (originally  suggested  by Berle
and Means),  thirty percent cut-off,  and forty percent cut-off. The four ownership  cut-off
levels are used for robustness  purposes,  but also help us compare the concentration  of
ownership  across countries,  size, and age of corporations. Consistent  with the previous
literature,  however,  the twenty  percent  cut-off  is used as the benchmark.
In  the majority of  cases, the principal shareholders are  themselves corporate
entities, not-for-profit foundations, or  financial institutions.  We then identify their
owners,  the owners  of their owners,  etc. We do not distinguish  among  individual  famnily
members  and use the family group as a unit of analysis.  The exception  is the Suharto
family  in Indonesia,  which  we discuss  in Section  VI.
Our definition  of ownership  relies on control rights, and not on cash flow rights.
This distinction  can make an enormous  difference  in the analysis. Suppose,  for example,
that a family owns 11%  of the stock of publicly-traded  Firm A, which in turn has 21  % of
the stock of Firm B.  Since we look at control rights, we would say that the famnily
controls 11% of Firm B-the  weakest link in the chain of voting rights.  In contrast,  we
would say that the family  owns about 2% of the cash flow rights of Firm B-the  product
2 While significant  sources  of ownership  information  exist on the internet  (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer,  1998  for details) we used exclusively  hard copy reports, which proved more efficient  given
the number  of companies  covered  in the database.
7of the two ownership stakes along the chain.  To make the distinction between cash-flow
and  control  rights,  we  document  deviations  from  one-share-one-vote  rules  and
pyramiding structures for each firm.
We divide  corporations into widely-held  and  corporations with  ultimate  owners
(with ultimate ownership defined at the four cut-off levels described above).  A widely-
held corporation is a corporation which does not have any owners who have significant
control rights. Ultimate owners are further divided into four categories: families (which
includes individuals who have large stakes), the state, widely-held financial institutions
such as banks and insurance companies, and widely-held corporations.  Initially, we also
formed a separate group for miscellaneous owners such as employee-stock  ownership
plans,  managers  not  related  to  the  controlling  owners,  and  cooperatives.  Since the
number of such entities was very  small (at most  1% of total  ownership in the case of
Japan), we pooled such ownership structures in the widely-held category.
Our definition of ultimate control means a firm can have more than one significant
owner.  If, for example, Firm C has three owners-a  family, the state, and a widely-held
corporation-each  with 10% of voting rights, we say that this  firm is  1/3 controlled by
each type of owner at the 10% level.  At the 20% level, however, Firm C is widely-held
as none of the three owners has 20% of the voting rights.  A different picture emerges if
the owners do not have equal shares of voting rights.  Take, for example, Firm D which
has two owners-a  farnily with 30% voting rights and a widely-held financial institution
with 10% of the voting rights.  At the 10% cut-off the family and the financial institution
are assigned l/2  each of ultimate control.  At the 20% and 30% levels, however, Firm D is
defined to be 100% family-controlled.  And Firm D is defined as widely-held at the 40%
cut-off level. To better understand the variety of ownership structures that determine the
ultimate control of companies, we first illustrate several examples from  our data. The
examples show some of the complications in the construction of ultimate ownership and
the wealth of data that are necessary to ensure proper tracing of the ultimate owners in
East Asian corporations.
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The first set of examples is based on the organizational chart of  the Ayala group,
the largest conglomerate in the Philippines (Figure 1). We identify 46 companies in our
database whose ultimate owner is the Ayala family. First, we look at the ownership of the
Ayala  Corporation,  the  second  largest  publicly-held  company  on  the  Manila  Stock
Exchange  in  terms  of  market  capitalization.  Note  that  the  largest  publicly-owned
company  (Ayala  Land)  and  the  fifth-largest publicly-owned  company  (Bank  of  the
Philippine Islands) also belong to the Ayala conglomerate.  The principal owners of the
Ayala corporation are the privately held Mermac Inc. (58% of total Ayala Corp. shares),
and the Mitsubishi Bank (20%).  Each other owner of Ayala Corp. has less than 10% of
the stock.  We next trace the owners of the owners of Ayala Corp. The Ayala family has
100% of the control of Mermac Inc., while Meiji Life Insurance of Japan has 23% control
of Mitsubishi Bank.  There are no other significant owners of Mitsubishi Bank.  We now
can say that the ultimate owners of the Ayala Corp. are the Ayala family (with 58% of
control rights) and Meiji Life Insurance with 20% of the control rights.
Next, we study the ultimate control structure of Globe Telecom, another member of
the  Ayala conglomerate.  The  two principal  owners  of  Globe  Telecom  are  the ITT
corporation  (32%)  and  the  Ayala  corporation  (40%).  We  have,  however,  already
9established that Ayala Corp. is controlled by the Ayala family and Meiji Life Insurance.
We hence conclude that  Globe Telecom has three ultimate  owners: the Ayala family
(40%), the ITT corporation (32%), and Meiji Life Insurance (20%).
Finally, we can investigate ultimate control for the Automated Electronics company
(the lower right corner of Figure 1).  Two of the ultimate owners are easily identified, the
International Finance Corporation (USA) and Japan Asia Inc. (Japan)  are both widely-
held corporations in their respective countries and control 20% of Automated Electronics
each. Another 30% of Automated Electronics is owned by Assemblies Inc., which in turn
is owned almost entirely (90%) by IMicro Electronics, which in turn is majority owned
(74%) by the Ayala Corp.  We thus determine that at the 20% cut-off level, Automated
Electronics has four ultimate owners: IFC (USA) with 20%, Japan Asia Inc. (Japan) with
20%, Meiji Life Insurance (Japan) with 20%, and the Ayala Family with 30%.
Figure 2: The Li Ka-shing Group
Cheung Kong  C  i  h  S
so  50~~~~~~~~~~~Reore  Cmeca
,  ~~~~~40  1  44  '
tCorslidated  Hopewell  Evergo
,,  ~~~~~~~~~Dao  Heng Bank Ltd  aGuoco  112  13  KwongI
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3  Holding  SangHong 
1 
Whampoa  is  the  secon  argendshIt,Cemaunag  23n  istesxhlags,Hn  on  lcrci
1  5~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~1the  thirteenth  largest,  Dai  Heng  Bank  is  the  twenty-second  largest,  etc.  Using  the
information on Figure 2, we identify who the ultimate owners of Hong Kong Electric,
and Dao Heng Bank are.
Hong Kong Electric has only one ultimate owner-the  Li Ka-shing family, which
controls 34% of the vote.  We establish this following the ownership chain of Li Ka-
shing:  Cheung Kong - Hutchison Whampoa - Cavendish International  - Hong  Kong
Electric, where the weakest link in the chain is the 34% control of Hong Kong Electric by
Cavendish International.  The Dao Heng Bank  has two ultimate  owners,  Kwek Leng
Chan (a Malaysian businessman) with 36%, and Li Ka-shing with 12%.  This is because
Kwek Leng Chan owns 36% of Guoco Holdings which in turn owns 70% of Dao Heng
Bank; Li Ka-shing  owns 35% of  Cheung Kong which  owns  12% of  Guoco Holding
which in turn owns 70% of Dao Heng Bank.
Finally, to illustrate some more interesting control chains, we study the ownership
structure of the Yasuda (Fuji) group, the fourth largest keiretsu in Japan.  The group has a
total of  122 companies, but  only in forty-one of these did we find a combined control
stake (of 10% or more) by other members of the group.  (We use the term  combined
control stake as each  firm in the group may be owned by more than one  other group
member.)  The ultimate owner of the group is Yasuda Life Insurance which is a widely-
held financial institution and the fourteenth largest publicly-traded  company in  Japan.
The other  prominent  member  of  the  group  is  Fuji  Bank  which  is  the  sixth  largest
publicly-traded company in Japan. To illustrate the issue of combined control stake, we
examine the control structure of Oki Electric and Nihon Cement (Figure 3).
Yasuda Life Insurance owns 16% of Oki Electric's  stock directly (the top left part
of the figure), but also owns  11% of Yasuda Fire and Marine Company which in turn
owns 7% of Oki Electric. Yasuda Life Insurance also owns 14% of Fuji Bank which also
holds 20% of Oki Electric.  In total, Yasuda Life is the ultimate owner of Oki Electric
with  37% (16% directly, 7% through Yasuda Fire and Marine, and  14% through Fuji
Bank).  The control pattern of Nihon Cement is similar-Yasuda  Life owns 13% directly,
12% through Yasuda Trust Bank, and 14% through Fuji Bank, for a total control of 39%ho.
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12publicly-listed  companies  in  family  hands,  and  only  0.6%  are  directly  widely-held.
Singapore is another interesting example with almost a quarter (23.6%) of its companies
state-controlled.
At the 20% (benchmark) cut-off level the differences across countries widen.  Less
than  one-tenth  of  Japanese companies  (9.7%) are now  controlled by  families, while
almost four-fifths (79.8%) are widely-held.  This drop in family-control arises as marny
Japanese companies have family ownership between 10% and 20%.  At a threshold of
20%, these corporations are defined as widely-held.  An even more dramatic change take
place in Korea, where  family control drops from 67.9% to  48.4%, and Taiwan, where
family control decreases from 65.6% to 48.2%.  The ultimate  control structure in the
Indonesian  sample  goes  in  the  opposite  direction-the  share  of  family  ownership
increases  at  the  expense  of  state,  widely-held  financial,  and  widely-held  corporate
ownership-as  there are more corporations where families are the single largest owner.
A similar, but even more pronounced pattern can be observed for Thailand where family
control increases from 50.8% to  61.6%, and Malaysia, where  family control  increases
from  57.7% to  67.2%.3  The most  stable control structure between  these two  cut-off
levels is observed in the Philippines and Singapore.
Using the next two cut-off levels (the last two panels in Table 2), one would expect
to find increasing share of widely-held companies, and decreasing shares in the other four
categories.  This  pattern  is  indeed borne  out  in  the  data  but  with  some  interesting
differences across countries.  For example, while less than one percent of Japanese firrns
are family controlled at the 40% level, more than a third of Indonesian (35.4%) and Thai
(38.9%) firms still remain in family control.  Some of these differences likely arise from
variations  in  company  laws  across  countries  and  company-specific  charters.  For
example, differences  in minimum  percentages in  shareholdings required  for blocking
major decisions or the minimum percentages required to entitle a shareholder to call san
extraordinary shareholders'  meeting are likely important in  determining  the minimum
shareholder stake necessary to exercise effective control.
3The  increase  in family  control  is due to the definition  of ultimate  ownership. For example,  if a firrn  has
three owners  - a family which controls  20%, a bank which controls 10%, and a widely-held  corporation
13Other rules  also  affect  the  size of  ownership necessary  to  be  able to  exercise
effective control.  In Korea, for example, restrictions on the voting rights of institutional
investors in listed companies and high minimum percentages required to file class-action
suits (30% of the vote) imply that relatively low ownership stakes can result in effective
control.  An additional likely factor is the evolution of capital markets more generally. In
Indonesia and Thailand, for example, formal stock markets were only established in 1977
and 1975 respectively, while the stock market in Japan has been in existence since 1878,
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong has been in operation since  1891.  This may have
influenced the degree to  which corporations  are widely-held.  Furthermore,  following
World War  II, there  was  a  deliberate  policy  of the  Occupational  Forces  to  disperse
ownership more widely in Japan (see Aoki, 1990).  While important at the 10% and 20%
control levels, the role of widely-held financial institutions is greatly diminished at the
30% level for all countries.  This is not  surprising since in  four of the nine countries
(Hong Kong, Japan, Korea,  Singapore) there are limits to the  share of ownership that
banks can have in other companies, while such ownership is not perrnitted in Indonesia
altogether (Institute of International Bankers, 1997).
A. Does Size Matter?
We next examine whether ultimate control differs across companies as their size varies.
Market capitalization is used  as a proxy  for size and  identify  the largest twenty, the
median  fifty,  and  the  bottom  fifty  companies  in  each  country.  The  first  group of
companies is directly comparable to the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998)
sample - these are also the largest twenty companies on their respective stock markets.
This  is not necessarily the case for the  other two groups -- the median  fifty, and the
bottom fifty companies in our sample are not exactly the median fifty and bottom fifty of
all listed corporations in each country.  We decided on the 20-50-50 breakdown for three
reasons.  First, as stated earlier, the first group should replicate the results of previous
studies for the  countries where we  have an  overlap-Hong  Kong, Japan,  Korea,  and
Singapore-which  would make our findings more robust.  Second, we wanted the median
and small-firms groups to include a larger number of companies as we  expected more
which  controls 10%  - it is only 1/3 controlled  by the family  at the 10%  level, but is fully controlled  by the
family  at the 20% level. The firm is widely-held  at higher  cut-off  levels.
14variation in control structures across those types of companies.  Third, our sample for the
Philippines has only 120 companies, and consequently it was not possible to make any of
the groups larger as they currently cover all Philippine firmns.
Size appears to matter significantly in explaining the distribution of control across
ownership classes.  Table 3 provides the comparisons within each country at the 20% cut-
off level (Tables Al-A3  also show the descriptive statistics for the other cut-off levels).
In most countries, the share of family ownership increases for smaller-size firms.  This
pattern is especially strong in Japan, where only one of the largest twenty is in family
control, while 57% of the smallest 50 companies are controlled by families.  The same
dramatic increase in family control is observed in the Korean sample where only four of
the largest twenty companies are family-controlled, while forty-eight of the smallest fifty
companies fall into that category.  The magnitude of the increase of  family control in
smaller-size companies is similar in Taiwan (from 15% to 80%).  In Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand the same pattern is present although it is not as
strong, as many large companies are also controlled by families.  The exception is Hong
Kong, where  about three-fourths  of the  largest  twenty  companies  are  under  family-
control, while less than 60% of the smallest fifty companies are in the same category.
Consistent with the results in Table 2, these statistics also show that the majority of
large and medium-size Japanese and Korean corporations are widely-held.  All bottom
fifty companies in both countries have, however, ultimate owners.  In contrast, there is
much less variation of control structures across company size in the Philippines, although
this result may be  driven by the smaller sample in that country.  In all other countries,
widely-held  corporations are the exception, particularly  so for small corporations,  but
also for large and medium-size corporations.
It is useful to compare our results for the largest twenty companies with La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and  Shleifer (1998).  We focus on  Hong Kong, Japan,  Korea,  and
Singapore-the  East Asian countries reported in both studies.  We obtain identical results
for Japan and Singapore, while the differences in Hong Kong and Korea are within  -ive
percent of ownership (note also that they report ownership data for either 1995 and 1996,
while we use exclusively 1996 data, which could explain some of the differences).  This
implies that the data on corporate ownership across East Asia are fairly robust.
15The differences in control structures across firm size bring about a more complete
picture of cross-country differences at the 20% cut-off level once we weigh by market
capitalization (Table 4). State ownership becomes much more pronounced, especially in
Singapore  (40.1%),  Malaysia  (34.8%),  Thailand  (24.1%),  and  Korea  (19.9%).  The
control of widely-held financial institutions and corporations is diminished, so is control
by families.
B.  Differences in Control due to Age of Companies
Another  possible  determinant  of  the control  structure  of  companies  is  their  age.  In
particular, some previous papers argue that younger companies are more likely to have a
few  ultimate  owners,  while  older  companies  are  more  frequently  widely-held.
Anecdotally, this argument holds some appeal if one were to look at the US market where
the recent deluge of technology-related companies may have  increased the number of
companies with a few owners with large stakes.  Microsoft, for example, has one ultimate
owner,  Bill  Gates,  with  24%  of  the  stock;  so  does  Yahoo!  where  the  Japanese
entrepreneur  Masayoshi  Son  has  29%  of  the  voting  rights.  The  evidence  is  less
convincing  in  the international  context.  It  is  difficult to  explain,  for  example, why
Belgium  and Sweden rank  high  in family  control in  La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and
Shleifer (1998); companies in  these two countries are surely older than  companies in
(say) Australia, yet Australian companies are predominantly widely-held.
To investigate the relation between age and corporate control  structures, we run
simple correlations between the number of years the corporation has been in operation
(the year of incorporation is obtained from Worldscope; 1996 is considered the end year)
and the control stake (voting rights) of the largest owner.  The results  are presented in
Table 5.  Interestingly, only in Japan are older firms more widely-held. In the other eight
countries,  the  correlation  coefficients  are  always  positive  (older  firms  have  more
concentrated corporate control), and these coefficients are statistically significant for the
Indonesian, Malaysian,  and Taiwanese  samples.  Note  that  the  average  age of  listed
Japanese corporates is about twice as high (57.2 years) as that of the other samples.
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In this section we discuss some other mechanisms which enhance corporate control even
in the presence  of small  control stakes.  The first  question relates  to  the differences
between cash-flow rights and voting power.  In particular, can we find evidence of use of
multiple classes of voting rights, and pyramid structures?  We also investigate the role of
cross-holdings, although our data here are less complete, as it becomes  impossible  to
follow all the cross-holding patterns in such a large sample.  For example, we identified
273 cross-holdings among the forty-two companies of the Yasuda (Fuji) group alone.
We begin with a description of the magnitude of deviations from one-share-one-
vote through shares with different voting rights (Table 6).  Such deviations  tend to be
very small in the East Asian countries, it takes on average  19.23% of all shares to get
20% of voting rights (Table 6, Cap=20%V).  This is consistent with the findings in La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) that companies around the world do not tend
to use much the opportunities of issuing shares with superior voting rights. Note that we
may actually exaggerate the importance of deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule as
we do not consider company-specific voting caps, as we generally do not have access to
company charters.
Pyramid structures are defined in Berle and Means (1932) as  "owning a majority
of the stock of one corporation which in turn holds a majority of the stock of another - a
process that can be repeated a number of times." In our sample, for more than two-fifths
of companies ultimate control at the 20% level involves the use of a pyramid structure,
with  the number being the largest in Indonesia (66.9%)  and the  smallest  in Thailand
(12.7%). Singaporean companies also show a high incidence of pyramiding, while only a
quarter of non-widely-held  companies  in Hong Kong are  controlled through  pyramid
structures.
Next we study cross-holdings patterns where a company down the chain of control
has some shares in another company in her chain of control.  We do not find significant
evidence of cross-holdings, with the exception of Malaysia and Singapore where 14.9%
and 15.7% of companies have some cross-ownership.  Interestingly, Korean companies
are above the average for the nine East Asian countries on that indicator even thougrh
cross-holdings are limited by  law (note that our indicator on  cross-holdings  does not
weigh by  size of  cross-holdings). This  point was  also made  by  La Porta,  Lopez-de-
17Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) - paradoxically, most of the countries which have limits on
cross-holdings (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Korea, Spain) appear to have higher
incidence  of  cross-ownership.  Thai  companies  display  the  least  evidence  of  cross-
holdings, a meager 0.8%.
We  also  identify  two  additional  means  through  which  ultimate  control  is
strengthened.  The first one  is to calculate the  share of firms  where there  is a single
controlling owner.  A second controlling owner is defined as somebody who has at least
10% of the voting rights.  The idea is that if such a party (or parties) exists, it may be
more difficult for the first owner to force her will on the Board of Directors. The data
show that in more than half of the sample companies which  are not widely-held at the
20% level the ultimate owners are alone.  This share is the highest in Japan (87.2%) and
the lowest in Thailand (18.9%).  The results for Thailand, combined with the low degree
of use of pyramids and cross-holdings, reflects the importance in Thailand of informal
alliances  among  the  small  number  of  families  controlling  most  of  Thai  companies.
Often, several families will jointly  own a large stake in a corporation, with one family in
the alliance taking the role of primary controlling shareholder (see further Suehiro, 1993
for a narrative of inter-family business cooperation in Thailand).
Finally,  we  study  the  separation  of  control  and  management  by  investigating
whether a member of the controlling family, or an employee of the controlling widely-
held financial institution or corporation is the CEO, Chairmnan,  Honorary Chairman, or
Vice-Chairman of the company.  It is generally difficult to find whether a manager is an
employee of a controlling financial institution or corporation, although such information
does exist in  the Stock Exchange Investment guides of several East Asian companies.  It
is much easier to find family membership, even if the particular manager does not have
the same last name.  This is because in most countries we have been able to obtain the
family trees for the fifteen largest family groups.
As an example, we study the family in control of the Tainanbang group in Taiwan.
The family consists of nineteen members, each of which has one or more management or
board of directors positions in corporations controlled.  There are five different family
names - simply following the last name of the founder (Wu Xiuqi) would have resulted in
eight family  members  only.  The Tainanbang group is  in  the  hands  of Wu  Zunxian
(brother  of  the  founder),  Wu  Junjie  (brother),  Wu  Junsheng  (sister),  Wu  Wuxiang
18(brother), Wu Sanilan (cousin), Wu Zhongzheng (nephew), and Gao Qingyuan (partner).
Wu  Sanilan's  son  (Wu  Junmin)  is  on  the  Board  of  Directors  of  three  companies
controlled by the Tainanbang.  Gao Lai Huan (Gao Qingyuan's  wife)  and Gao Xiuling
(his daughter)  are  also  involved  in  the management  of  firms  within  the  group.  NVu
Wuxiang's husband, Hou Yuli, her son Hou Yongdu, her sons-in-law Huang Jindai and
Yan  Xiufeng,  her  daugther-in-law  Hou  Chen,  and  her  grandchildren  (the  founder's
grandnephews) Hou Boyi, Hou Boyu, and Hou Boming are acting as either managers or
sit on the Board of Directors of one or more Tainanbang companies.
The correspondence between control and management is particularly striking in our
data (Table 6, last column).  On average, two-thirds of companies which are not widely-
held have the controlling owner appoint a member of top management.  Four-fifths or
more  of  companies  in  Indonesia, Korea,  Malaysia,  and  Taiwan  have  managers  who
belong to the controlling group. The correspondence between control and management. is
less  frequent in  Japan  and  the Philippines,  where  less than  half of  the managers  are
family-related to the controlling owner.  In the former case, this finding is consistent with
previous  sociological  studies,  which  generally  conclude  that  "The  Japanese  had  a
tradition of professional management well before the Meiji Restoration - before, that is,
the  country had  even  embarked  on  the  industrialization  process"  (Fukuyama,  1996,
p.329).  The latter is in part explained by the tendency of Philippine corporations to have
interlocking directorates and management boards, whereby members of one family would
serve on the Board of Directors or Management Board of companies controlled by other
influential families (Tan, 1993).
The  numbers  on  managers  affiliated  to  the  controlling  families  are  somewhat
higher as the ones reported in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998).  This is
probably because in many cases we have succeeded in tracing family members which do
not have the same last name, and also because smaller companies are more likely to have
an owner who is also the CEO or the Board Chairman (while their sample consists of
large companies only).
Overall, the results suggest some remarkable similarities across the nine East Asian
countries in terms of the forms and means through which  corporations  are ultimately
controlled.  While there are some differences, related in part to the development of stock
markets, legal  and regulatory rules, most  countries exhibit a  similar pattern  of  family
19control  through  pyramid  structures  and  management  which  is  family-related  to  the
ultimate owners.
V.  Cross-Country  Differences  in the Concentration  of Control
As stated earlier, the differences in control patterns across corporations may be related to
firm-specific (size, age, sector, protection of minority shareholders) and country-specific
(legal rules and the general level of development) factors.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (1998)  show a higher incidence of widely-held  corporations in  countries
with good legal protection of minority shareholders.  They also point out, however, the
possibility of endogeneity of legal rules, a question we try to address in the next section.
Here, we regress the control structures on some simple proxies  for firm- and country-
specific factors. Specifically, we perform the following regression:
CONTROLi  = a + b,*log(Sizej)  + b2*log (AGEi)+  b3*DEVIATEi  + b4*MANAGERi  +
b5*PYRAMID 1 + b6*1og(GNP)  + Country  Dummies  + Sector  Dummies  + u,
where CONTROL is the control stake of  the largest ultimate owner  of firm i,  Size is
proxied by the log-level of the share of market capitalization of firm i in total market
capitalization within each country, AGE is proxied by the log-level  of the number of
years  since establishment  of the firm, DEVIATE  captures the  firm-specific deviation
from one-share-one-vote and is a discrete variable that takes on the value of 1 if there are
deviations  between  cash  flow  and  control rights  and  0  otherwise. 4 We  also  include
dummies  for  companies  where  managers  belong  to  the  controlling  families
(MANAGER), and where control is enhanced by pyramiding (PYRAMID).  The overall
level of development of the country is proxied by the log-level of the per-capita GNP of
that country in  1996. Country dummies are used to proxy  for the efficiency of judicial
system, rule of law, and corruption to the extent that they are not accounted for by the
log(GNP) variable. 5
4 Differerent  from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes  and Shleifer  (1998),  whom  use a country-specific  dummy,
we use a firm-specific  dummy variable for deviations from one-share-one-vote.  We also used a firm-
specific dummy variable to control for any requirement  for mandatory dividends.  This variable is,
however,  highly correlated  with the one-share-one-vote  dummy and was consequently  not used in the
regression.
5 Sector  dummies  (at the 1  -digit  SIC level)  were used as corporations  in different  sectors  can be expected  to
have different governance structures.  In the end, the sector dummies were not jointly statistically
significant  and did not display  any discernible  pattern  and  were hence  dropped  in the final  regression.
20We  find  that the  age of  a  company, deviations  between  cash-flow  and control
rights, and the presence of managers from the controlling family are all positively related
to  the  concentration  of  control  (Table  7,  regression  1). Concentration  of  control  is
negatively  correlated  with  company  size and  the degree  to  which  owners  engage in
pyramiding. These relationships  are statistically very robust.  The country dummies are
also very  significant and account  for a large portion of the explanatory power of thc
regressions.  The dummy for Japan is negative (Korea is the numeraire), the dummy for
Taiwan has  the  smallest  positive  coefficient  and  is  marginally  significant, while thc
dummy for Thailand is the most statistically significant and has the largest coefficient.
The significance of the country dummies is not due to heteroskedasticity problems-both
regressions  have White-corrected  errors.  The dummies'  coefficients  exhibit  a  pattern
which is negatively related to the level of income-with  Japan the smallest (negative)
and Indonesia and Thailand the highest. This suggests that the country dummies pick up
some  of  the  cross-country  differences  in  the  level  of  economic  and  institutional
development.
We also run the regression by including a proxy for each country's  overall level of
economic  development  and  dropping  the  country  dummies  (regression  2).  The
concentration  of control is negatively related to per-capita GNP (with a t-statistic of -16).
The results  are consistent with the  findings in La Porta  et al. (1998).  High ultimate
ownership is more likely observed in countries where minority protection is weak and the
concentration  of  control  diminishes  with  an  increase  in  the  level  of  economic
development.
VI.  The Aggregate Effects of Extensive Family Control
So far we have investigated the incidence of ultimate control at the level of the individual
firm.  Perhaps a more meaningful unit of analysis, particularly if we are concerned with
issues of market entry, access to financing, and government policy, is pattern of control
of the corporate sector by family group(s).  To capture this, we analyze first the number
of firms in the sample controlled on average by a single family. The results are reported
in Table 8 (first column).  Indonesia has the largest number of companies controlled by a
21single family,  more than four  on average.  Japan  has  the least  number,  each family
controls approximately one company.
These numbers  already  suggest that the ultimate  control of the corporate  sector
rests in the hands of a small number of families in most countries. This can be further
demonstrated  by  the  number  of  firms  and  end-1996  market  value  of  total  assets
6 controlled  by  the  largest  family  group  in  each  country  (not  reported).  The  largest
conglomerate in Indonesia, for example, is the Salim group which is mainly controlled by
Soedono Salim, but  also in part controlled by the Suharto  family.  Since the Suharto
family has  a  number of  other holdings,  we  choose  it  as  the  largest  stock-holder in
Indonesia.  Of all the firms in our sample, the members of the Suharto family collectively
controls assets worth US$24 billion.  The largest family holder in terms of assets across
all nine  countries  is  the  Chung  Ju-Yung  family,  owners  of  Hyundai  and  its  related
companies, with holdings worth US$48 billion.
Another measure of wealth concentration is the share of total market capitalization
held by the top 1, top 5 etc. families. 7 At the extreme, 16.6% and 17.1% of total market
capitalization in Indonesia and the Philippines respectively (Table 8, third column) can be
traced to the ultimate control of a single family (the Suhartos and the Ayalas).  The top
ten families in Indonesia  and the Philippines control more than half  of the  corporate
sector (57.7% and 52.5% respectively) in terms of market capitalization (Table 8, fifth
column). The concentration of control is also high in Thailand (46.2%) and Hong Kong
(32.1%).  A  quarter  of  the  corporate  sector  in  Korea,  Malaysia,  and  Singapore  is
controlled  by  the  largest  ten  families.  In  contrast,  family  control  in  Japan  is
insignificant-the  largest ten families own only 2.4% of market capitalization.
These results suggest that a relatively small number of families effectively control
most East Asian economies.  The question arise whether these families have  a strong
effect on the economic policy of governments.  One direct mechanism for such an effect
6 This  does not necessarily  coincide  with the largest  business  groups  in the country. This is particularly  the
case for Japan,  where the largest  keiretsu  - the Mitsubishi  group  - controls over 400 affiliated  firms. But
the Mitsubishi  group  does not have a single  controlling  family.
7 To avoid  discrepancies  in the cross-country  comparison  due to different  sample  coverage,  we scaled  down
the control holdings  of each family group by assuming  that the firms missing from our sample are not
controlled  by any of the largest fifteen families.  For example,  the largest five families in the Philippines
control  52.2% of the market  capitalization  in our sample. Since the sample firms represent 82% of total
market  capitalization  in the Philippines  (Table 1), we reach an adjusted  figure of 42.8% (52.2%*82%)  for
the control  holdings  of the largest  five families  (Table  8, third column).
22is  the  extension  of  preferential  treatment  to  family  members  of  senior  governmlent
members.  A case in point is the business empire of the Suharto family  in Indonesia,
which controls 417 listed and unlisted companies that we could identify in our samnple
through  a  number  of  business  groups  led by  children,  other  relatives,  and  business
partners,  many  of  whom,  besides  Suharto  himself,  also  serve  in  some  governmTent
functions (Figure 4).8
Another  mechanism of  symbiosis between  government  and  business  is through
indirect control of companies by the ruling political  parties.  An example is the mrain
political party Kuomintang in Taiwan which has a controlling stake in  155 companies,
some of which overseas. Kuomintang's  corporate holdings range from scores of srnall
textile  and pharmaceutical  businesses to  highly protected  oligopolies  in  the  financial
industry, which have exclusive rights over a wide array of investment transactions. Many
companies under Kuomintang's control are also exempted from disclosing any financial
or ownership information since they operate in  industries related to  national  defense,
making  it  difficult to  estimate the  true magnitude  of  the party's  corporate  portfolio
(Baum, 1994). The main political parties in Malaysia - Umno and the Malaysian Indian
Congress - also have substantial business holdings. The most  direct mechanism is, of
course,  through  the  large  state-controlled  companies  prevalent  in  Singapore  and
Malaysia.
The concentration of wealth, and the important direct and indirect channels through
which the government may play an active role in business activity and businessmen mnay
influence politicians,  raises  the possibility  that the  legal  systems in  some  East Asian
countries  may  be  endogenous  to  the  forms  and  concentration  of  control  over  the
corporate sector.  If the role of a limited number of families the corporate sector is large
and the government is heavily involved in and influenced by business, the legal systelm  is
less likely to evolve in a manner to protect minority shareholders, and more generally to
8 Other examples  abound.  Imelda Marcos, the widow of the former Philippine president Ferdinand
Marcos, has detailed the extent of her family's grip on the economy as follows: "We practically own
everything  in the Philippines  from electricity,  telecommunications,  airlines, banking, beer and tobacco,
newspaper  publishing, television stations,  shipping, oil and  mining,  hotels  and beach  resorts,  down to
coconut milling, small farms, real estate and insurance" (Financial Times, 1998), which include holdings in
more than 100 listed companies.  Since many of these holdings were acquired under the names of Marcos's
partners, we were not able to track them in our sample.
23promote  transparent  and  market-based  activities.  While  this  argument  has  been
frequently  advanced by  scholars in  the  wake  of the  East  Asia  financial  crisis,  little
evidence has been collected to support it.
Figure 4:  The Suharto Group
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24development, and as documented by La Porta et al. (1998),  a relationship between the
judicial and legal development and the ownership structures of individual corporations.
VII.  Conclusions
In most East Asian countries, wealth is very  concentrated in the hands of few families
and  links  between  government  and  business  are  extensive.  Legal  and  regulatory
developments may have been impeded by the concentration of corporate wealth and the
extensive  links  between  corporations  and  government,  either  directly  or  indirectly.
Consequently,  relationships  between  patterns  of  ownership  and  legal  and  other
institutional variables are not necessary casual, as has been suggested, at least for some
other countries.  The possible endogeneity of the legal systems implies that future legal
and regulatory reform in some East Asian countries may not be independent of changes
in ownership structures and concentration of wealth.
Insider-control  may  also  have  contributed to  the  weak  performance  and  risky
investment of many East Asian corporations prior to the crisis. Our results allow for a re-
examination of the relationships between ownership structure and corporate performnance,
since previous  studies  only  looked  at  the  immediate  owners  and  not  the  ultimate,
controlling owners.  The finding that many firms in East Asia belong to the same group
and/or are controlled  by  a  single family  also  suggests that  further research  may  be
warranted on the performance of firms belonging to the same group or controlled by the
same family  and on  the corporate  governance  mechanisms  used within  such groups.
These relationships  between performance and ownership  structures can be researched
using data from before the crisis. One can also investigate whether the perfornance  of
firms during the 1997 financial crisis depended on their ownership structures and possible
affiliations to a group.  The large shocks many firms experienced as a result of the East
Asia  financial crisis  provide  an  unique opportunity  to  understand  how resources  are
allocated within groups, especially as access to external financial markets was sharply
diminished.  This line of research may in turn offer several important insights as to how
corporate governance and corporate restructuring in East Asia can be improved.  Finally,
the large role played by a few families in East Asian corporate  sectors suggest that an
investigation  of  the  evolution  of  legal  and  judicial  systems  in  relation  to  wealth
concentration may be particularly insightful for some of these countries.
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28Table 1:  Coverage of the Sample
2,980 newly-assembled data for publicly-traded corporations (including both financial institutions and non-financial institutions) are collected from Worldscope, the
Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the Japan Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the 1997 Annual Reports of the Hong Kong, Jakarta, Seoul,  Kuala Lumpur,
and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade Commission, the Securities Exchange  of Thailand Companies Handbook
(1998),  the Singapore Investment  Guide (1998) and IFR Handbook of World Stock and Commodity Exchanges (1997).  In all cases, we collect the ownership
structure as of December 1996 or the end of the 1996 accounting year.
Country  Stock  Exchange  Est.  Number  of  Market  Cap.  No. of Companies Share  of Total
Companies  (US$ million)  in Our Sample  Market Cap.
Hong Kong  Stock Exchange of Hong Kong  1891  583  449,258  330  78
Indonesia  Jakarta Stock Exchange  1977  253  91,016  178  89
Japan  Tokyo Stock Exchange  1878  1749*  3,106,108  1240  93
Korea  Korea  Stock  Exchange  1956  760  138,817  345  76
Malaysia  Kuala  Lumpur  Stock  Exchange  1964  621  307,179  238  74
The Philippines  Philippine Stock Exchange  1965  216  80,649  120  82
Singapore  Stock Exchange of Singapore  1910  266*  153,234  221  96
Taiwan  Taipei Stock Exchange  1962  382  273,608  141  66
Thailand  Stock Exchange of Thailand  1975  454  99,828  167  64
*Main  Board only.
29Table 2:  Control of Publicly Traded Companies in East Asia
(unweighted)
Newly-assembled  data for 2,980  publicly-traded corporations  (including both  financial  institutions and
non-financial institutions) are collected from Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the
Japan Company Handbook  1999 (1998), the  1997 Annual  Reports of  the  Hong  Kong, Jakarta,  Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade
Commission, the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment
Guide  (1998) and IFR Handbook of  World Stock and Commodity Exchanges  (1997).  In  all cases, we
collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end of the 1996 accounting year.
Country  Number  of  Widely  Held  Family  State  Widely  Held  Widely  Held
Corporations  Financial  Corporation
10%  cut-off
Hong  Kong  330  0.6  64.5  3.7  7.1  24.1
Indonesia  178  0.6  67.1  10.2  3.8  18.3
Japan  1240  41.9  13.1  1.1  38.5  5.3
Korea  345  14.3  67.9  5.1  3.5  9.2
Malaysia  238  1.0  57.7  17.8  12.5  11.0
Philippines  120  1.7  41.3  3.6  16.8  36.7
Singapore  221  1.4  51.9  23.6  11.5  11.5
Taiwan  141  2.8  65.6  3.0  10.4  18.1
Thailand  167  2.2  50.8  7.5  17.9  21.7
20% cut-off
Hong Kong  330  7.0  66.7  1.4  5.2  19.8
Indonesia  178  5.1  71.5  8.2  2.0  13.2
Japan  1240  79.8  9.7  0.8  6.5  3.2
Korea  345  43.2  48.4  1.6  0.7  6.1
Malaysia  238  10.3  67.2  13.4  2.3  6.7
Philippines  120  19.2  44.6  2.1  7.5  26.7
Singapore  221  5.4  55.4  23.5  4.1  11.5
Taiwan  141  26.2  48.2  2.8  5.3  17.4
Thailand  167  6.6  61.6  8.0  8.6  15.3
30% cut-off
Hong  Kong  330  50.3  34.4  0.9  2.1  12.3
Indonesia  178  24.7  58.7  6.7  0.0  9.8
Japan  1240  94.8  2.8  0.4  0.4  1.6
Korea  345  76.2  20.1  1.2  0.0  2.5
Malaysia  238  41.2  45.6  8.2  0.0  5.0
Philippines  120  58.3  22.1  2.1  5.0  12.5
Singapore  221  45.2  32.6  11.3  2.3  8.6
Taiwan  141  73.0  18.4  2.8  1.4  4.3
Thailand  167  24.6  54.8  7.5  3.6  9.6
40% cut-off
Hong Kong  330  74.8  17.6  0.3  0.9  6.4
Indonesia  178  51.7  35.4  5.6  0.0  7.3
Japan  1240  97.6  0.9  0.3  0.0  1.2
Korea  345  94.8  3.5  0.9  0.0  0.9
Malaysia  238  77.3  14.7  4.2  0.0  3.8
Philippines  120  83.3  8.3  1.3  1.7  5.4
Singapore  221  74.7  14.9  3.6  1.4  5.4
Taiwan  141  91.5  5.0  2.8  0.0  0.7
Thailand  167  48.5  38.9  5.4  1.2  6.0
30Table 3:  Control of the Publicly Traded Companies in East Asia,
By Size (unweighted)
Newly-assembled data for  2,980 publicly-traded  corporations (including  both  financial institutions  and
non-financial institutions) are collected from Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the
Japan Company Handbook  1999 (1998), the  1997 Annual  Reports  of  the  Hong  Kong, Jakarta,  Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade
Commission, the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment
Guide  (1998) and IFR Handbook of World Stock and  Commodity Exchanges  (1997).  In  all cases, wme
collect the  ownership structure as  of  December  1996 or the  end  of the  1996 accounting  year. Size  is
classified as the largest 20 firms, the median 50 firms, and the bottom 50 firms.
Country  Category  Widely  Held  Family  State  Widely  Held  Widely  Held
Financial  Corporation
Hong  Kong  All  firms  7.0  66.7  1.4  5.2  19.8
Largest  20  5.0  72.5  7.5  10.0  5.0
Middle  50  6.0  66.0  2.0  4.0  22.0
Smallest 50  14.0  57.0  3.0  1.0  25.0
Indonesia  All firms  5.1  71.5  8.2  2.0  13.2
Largest 20  15.0  60.0  20.0  0.0  5.0
Middle 50  6.0  62.7  3.3  3.0  25.0
Smallest 50  0.0  93.0  0.0  1.0  6.0
Japan  All firms  79.8  9.7  0.8  6.5  3.2
Largest 20  90.0  5.0  5.0  0.0  0.0
Middle 50  96.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  2.0
Smallest 50  0.0  57.0  0.0  30.0  13.0
Korea  All firms  43.2  48.4  1.6  0.7  6.1
Largest 20  65.0  20.0  10.0  0.0  5.0
Middle 50  66.0  11.0  5.0  0.0  18.0
Smallest 50  0.0  97.0  0.0  1.0  2.0
Malaysia  All firms  10.3  67.2  13.4  2.3  6.7
Largest 20  30.0  35.0  30.0  0.0  5.0
Middle 50  12.0  69.0  10.0  4.0  5.0
Smallest 50  0.0  84.0  5.0  2.0  9.0
Philippines  All firms  19.2  44.6  2.1  7.5  26.7
Largest  20  40.0  40.0  7.5  7.5  5.0
Middle  50  16.0  42.0  0.0  9.0  33.0
Smallest 50  16.0  45.0  2.0  6.0  31.0
Singapore  All firms  5.4  55.4  23.5  4.1  11.5
Largest 20  20.0  32.5  42.5  0.0  5.0
Middle 50  10.0  46.0  35.0  4.0  5.0
Smallest 50  2.0  67.0  4.0  5.0  22.0
Taiwan  All firms  26.2  48.2  2.8  5.3  17.4
Largest 20  45.0  15.0  15.0  5.0  20.0
Middle 50  36.0  38.0  0.0  6.0  20.0
Smallest 50  6.0  80.0  0.0  4.0  10.0
Thailand  All firms  6.6  61.6  8.0  8.6  15.3
Largest 20  10.0  57.5  20.0  7.5  5.0
Middle 50  6.0  47.0  10.0  15.7  21.3
Smallest 50  0.0  76.7  2.7  5.0  15.7
31Table 4:  Control of Publicly Traded Companies in East Asia
(weighted  by market capitalization)
Newly-assembled  data for 2,980  publicly-traded  corporations (including both  financial  institutions and
non-fmnancial  institutions) are collected from Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the
Japan Company Handbook  1999 (1998),  the  1997 Annual  Reports of  the  Hong  Kong, Jakarta,  Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade
Conmmission,  the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment
Guide (1998) and  IFR Handbook of  World Stock and Commodity Exchanges  (1997).  In  all cases, we
collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end of the 1996 accounting year.
Country  Number  of  Widely  Held  Family  State  Widely  Held  Widely  Held
Corporations  Financial  Corporation
Hong  Kong  330  7.0  71.5  4.8  5.9  10.8
Indonesia  178  6.6  67.3  15.2  2.5  8.4
Japan  1240  85.5  4.1  7.3  1.5  1.6
Korea  345  51.1  24.6  19.9  0.2  4.3
Malaysia  238  16.2  42.6  34.8  1.1  5.3
Philippines  120  28.5  46.4  3.2  8.4  13.7
Singapore  221  7.6  44.8  40.1  2.7  4.8
Taiwan  141  28.0  45.5  3.3  5.4  17.8
Thailand  167  8.2  51.9  24.1  6.3  9.5
32Table 5:  Correlation between Age and the Size of Control Stakes
in East Asian Corporations
(full  samples)
Newly-assembled  data for 2,980 publicly-traded  corporations  (including  both financial institutions  and
non-financial  institutions)  are collected  from Worldscope,  the Asian Company  Handbook  1999  (1998),  the
Japan Company  Handbook 1999 (1998), the 1997 Annual Reports of the Hong Kong, Jakarta, Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur,  and Manila Stock Exchanges,  as well as with ownership  data from the Korean Fair Trade
Commission,  the Securities  Exchange  of Thailand  Companies  Handbook  (1998), the Singapore  Investment
Guide (1998) and IFR Handbook of World Stock and Commodity  Exchanges  (1997). In all cases, we
collect  the ownership  structure  as of December  1996  or the end of the 1996  accounting  year.
Country  Correlation  (Age;  Voting  Rights  of  Largest  Average  Age  Average  Control
Owner)  (Years)  )
Hong  Kong  0.212  28.8  28.1
Indonesia  0.241*  24.1  34.4
Japan  -0.204  57.2  8.9
Korea  0.139  31.2  18.2
Malaysia  0.308*  28.8  28.1
The Philippines  0.072  28.1  24.4
Singapore  0.089  26.8  27.3
Taiwan  0.278*  26.3  19.6
Thailand  0.103  21.2  35.6
*  significant  at the 5%  level.
33Table 6:  Means of Enhancing Control in East Asian Corporations
(full samples, percentage of total)
Newly-assembled  data for 2,980  publicly-traded  corporations (including both  financial  institutions and
non-fmnancial  institutions) are collected from Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the
Japan Company Handbook  1999 (1998), the  1997 Annual  Reports of  the  Hong  Kong, Jakarta,  Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade
Commnission,  the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment
Guide  (1998) and  IFR Handbook of  World Stock and Commodity Exchanges  (1997).  In  all cases, we
collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end of the 1996 accounting year. Cap=20%V is
the average minimum percent  of the book value of common equity required to control  20% of the vote;
Pyramids with Ultimate owners (when companies are not widely-held) equals 1 if the controlling owner
exercises control through at least one publicly-traded company, 0 otherwise; Cross-Holdings equals 1 if the
company has a controlling shareholder and owns any amount of shares in its controlling shareholder or in
another company in her chain of control, 0 otherwise; Controlling Owner Alone  equals 1 if there does not
exist a second owner who holds at least 10% of the stock, 0 otherwise;  Management equals 1 if the CEO,
Board Chairman or Vice-Chairman are from the controlling family, 0 otherwise.
Country  Cap=20%V  Pyramids  with  Cross  Holdings  Controlling  Owner  Management
Ultimate  Owners  Alone
Hong  Kong  18.84  25.1  9.3  68.1  53.4
Indonesia  19.17  66.9  1.3  50.9  84.6
Japan  19.89  36.4  11.6  87.2  37.2
Korea  19.64  42.6  9.4  76.7  80.7
Malaysia  18.11  39.3  14.9  37.4  85.0
The Philippines  18.71  40.2  7.1  35.1  42.3
Singapore  19.91  55.0  15.7  37.0  69.9
Taiwan  19.61  49.0  8.6  43.3  79.8
Thailand  19.22  12.7  0.8  18.9  67.5
East AsiaNine  19.23  40.8  8.7  50.6  66.8
34Table 7: Determinants of the Concentration of Control
(Coefficient, t-Statistics)
Newly-assembled  data  for 2,980  publicly-traded  corporations (including  both  financial  institutions  and  non-
financial institutions) in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Thailand are  collected  from  Worldscope, the  Asian  Company  Handbook  1999 (1998),  the  Japan  Cormipany
Handbook 1999 (1998), the  1997 Annual Reports of the Hong Kong, Jakarta, Seoul,  Kuala Lumpur, and Manila
Stock  Exchanges, as  well  as  with  ownership  data  from  the  Korean  Fair  Trade  Commission,  the  Securities
Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment Guide (1998) and IFR Handbook
of  World  Stock  and  Commodity  Exchanges  (1997).  In  all  cases, we  collect  the  ownership  structure  as  of
December 1996 or the end of the 1996 accounting year.  The dependent variable is the ownership of the largest
owner.
Explanatory  Variable  (1)  (2)
Size  -1.87  -0.81
(-3.03)  (-1.55)
Age  4.57  1.32
(25.04)  (3.03)
Manager  from Controlling  Family  3.53  5.39
(8.02)  (11.88)
Pyramid  -1.22  -2.86
(-2.96)  (-6.84)
Deviation from One-Share-One-  7.83  13.29
Vote  (6.02)  (9.53)
Per-capita  GNP  ---  -4.09
(-15-99)













(2.17)  _  _  _  _  _
|Thailand  19.63
(17.84)
Constant  33.38  61.46
(12.44)  (29.04)
Number  of Observations  2,980  2,980
Adjusted  R|  0.46  0.32
35Table  8:  How Concentrated  is Family Control?
Newly-assembled data  for 2,980  publicly-traded corporations (including both  financial  institutions  and
non-financial institutions) in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan,  and Thailand are collected from Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook  1999 (1998), the
Japan Company Handbook  1999 (1998),  the  1997 Annual  Reports  of  the  Hong Kong,  Jakarta, Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade
Commnission,  the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment
Guide  (1998) and IFR Handbook of  World Stock and  Commodity Exchanges  (1997).  In all  cases, we
collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end of the  1996 accounting year. The Average
Number of Firms per Family refers only to firms in the sample. To avoid discrepancies in the cross-country
comparison due to different sample coverage, we have scaled down the control holdings  of each family
group in the last four columns by assuming that the firms missing from our sample (see Table 1) are not
controlled by any of the largest fifteen families.
Country  Average  Number  of Firms  % of total market  capitalization  that families  control
per Family  Top I Family Top  5 Families Top 10  Families Top 15  Families
Hong  Kong  2.36  6.5  26.2  32.1  34.4
Indonesia  4.09  16.6  40.7  57.7  61.7
Japan  1.04  0.5  1.8  2.4  2.8
Korea  2.07  11.4  29.7  26.8  38.4
Malaysia  1.97  7.4  17.3  24.8  28.3
The Philippines  2.68  17.1  42.8  52.5  55.1
Singapore  1.26  6.4  19.5  26.6  29.9
Taiwan  1.17  4.0  14.5  18.4  20.1
Thailand  1.68  9.4  32.2  46.2  53.3
36Table 9: Are Judicial  Systems Endogenous?
Newly-assembled data for 2,980 publicly-traded corporations (including both financial institutions and
non-financial  institutions)  in  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia.  Japan,  Korea,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand are collected from Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook 1599
(1998), the Japan  Company Handbook  1999 (1998),  the  1997 Annual  Reports  of  the Hong  Kong,
Jakarta, Seoul,  Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as weil as with ownership data from the
Korean Fair Trade Commission, the Securities Exchange  of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),
the  Singapore  Investment  Guide  (1998)  and  IFR  Handbook  of  World  Stock  and  Commodity
Exchanges (1997). In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end of
the 1996 accounting year. The Concentration of Family Control (Top 15) comes from the last colu.mn
of Table 8. The Efficiency of Judicial Systeim.  is taken from Table 4 in La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1998) and  assesses the  "efficiency  and  integrity of  the  legal  environment as  it affects  business,
particularly foreign firms."  The Rule of Law and Corruption indices also come from Table 4 in La
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1998).
Country  Concentration  of Family  Efficiency  of  Rule  of Law  Corruption
Control  (Top 15)  Judicial  Systenm
Hong Kong  34.4  10.00  8.22  8.52
Indonesia  61.7  2.5(0  3.98  2.15
Japan  2.8  G1.00  8.98  8.52
Korea  38.4  6.00  5.35  5.30
Malaysia  28.3  9.00  6.78  7.38
The  Philippines  55.1  4.75  2.73  2.92
Singapore  29.9  10.0  8.57  8.22
Taiwan  20.1  6.75  8.52  6.85
Thailand  53.5  3.25  6.25  5.18
3  7Table Al:  Control  of the Largest  Twenty Publicly Traded Companies
Newly-assembled data  for 2,980  publicly-traded corporations  (including both  financial institutions  and
non-financial institutions) are collected from Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the
Japan  Company Handbook  1999 (1998),  the  1997 Annual Reports  of  the  Hong Kong,  Jakarta,  Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade
Commission, the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment
Guide  (1998) and IFR Handbook of World  Stock and  Commodity Exchanges  (1997).  In  all cases, we
collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end of the 1996 accounting year. Unweighted.
Country  Widely  Held  Family  State  Widely  Held  Widely  Held
Financial  Corporation
10%  cut-off
Hong Kong  0.0  67.5  12.5  12.5  7.5
Indonesia  5.0  60.0  22.5  0.0  12.5
Japan  65.0  5.0  5.0  25.0  0.0
Korea  25.0  47.5  17.5  0.0  10.0
Malaysia  5.0  34.6  36.3  15.4  8.8
Philippines  5.0  48.3  12.5  18.3  15.8
Singapore  10.0  38.3  45.8  3.3  2.5
Taiwan  15.0  37.9  16.3  14.6  16.3
Thailand  5.0  49.2  14.2  20.0  11.7
20% cut-off
Hong  Kong  5.0  72.5  7.5  10.0  5.0
Indonesia  15.0  60.0  20.0  0.0  5.0
Japan  90.0  5.0  5.0  0.0  0.0
Korea  65.0  20.0  10.0  0.0  5.0
Malaysia  30.0  35.0  30.0  0.0  5.0
Philippines  40.0  40.0  7.5  7.5  5.0
Singapore  20.0  32.5  42.5  0.0  5.0
Taiwan  45.0  15.0  15.0  5.0  20.0
Thailand  10.0  57.5  20.0  7.5  5.0
30% cut-off
Hong  Kong  85.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  0.0
Indonesia  45.0  35.0  15.0  0.0  5.0
Japan  95.0  0.0  5.0  0.0  0.0
Korea  80.0  10.0  i  0.0  0.0  0.0
Malaysia  50.0  20.0  25.0  0.0  5.0
Philippines  60.0  20.0  7.5  10.0  2.5
Singapore  90.0  0.0  10.0  0.0  0.0
Taiwan  75.0  5.0  15.0  0.0  5.0
Thailand  20.0  65.0  15.0  0.0  0.0
40% cut-off
Hong Kong  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Indonesia  60.0  25.0  15  0  0.0  0.0
Japan  95.0  0.0  5.0  0.0  0.0
Korea  90.0  5.0  5.0  0.0  0.0
Malaysia  65.0  10.0  20.0  0.0  5.0
Philippines  85.0  5.0  7.5  0.0  2.5
Singapore  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Taiwan  85.0  0.0  15.0  0.0  0.0
Thailand  30.0  60.0  10.0  0.0  0.0
38Table A2:  Control of the Fifty Median Publicly Traded Companies
Newly-assembled  data  for 2,980 publicly-traded  corporations  (including both  financial  institutions  and
non-financial institutions) are collected from Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the
Japan Company Handbook  1999 (1998), the  1997 Annual  Reports  of  the Hong  Kong,  Jakarta, Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur, and Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade
Commission, the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investnent
Guide (1998) and IFR Handbook of  World Stock and Comnnodity Exchanges  (1997).  In  all cases, we
collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end of the 1996 accounting year. Unweighted.
Country  Widely  Held  Family  State  Widely  Held  Widely  Held
Financial  Corporation
10% cut-off
Hong  Kong  0.0  63.0  3.2  7.0  26.8
Indonesia  0.0  59.3  4.7  7.0  29.0
Japan  1.0  9.0  0.0  79.7  10.3
Korea  0.0  48.7  16.0  10.0  25.3
Malaysia  0.0  59.0  13.5  13.7  13.8
Philippines  0.0  39.7  2.0  18.3  40.0
Singapore  2.0  47.7  32.0  11.7  6.7
Taiwan  2.0  64.7  0.0  11.7  21.7
Thailand  2.0  44.3  10.3  16.7  26.7
20% cut-off
Hong  Kong  6.0  66.0  2.0  4.0  22.0
Indonesia  6.0  62.7  3.3  3.0  25.0
Japan  96.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  2.0
Korea  66.0  11.0  5.0  0.0  18.0
Malaysia  12.0  69.0  10.0  4.0  5.0
Philippines  16.0  42.0  0.0  9.0  33.0
Singapore  10.0  46.0  35.0  4.0  5.0
Taiwan  36.0  38.0  0.0  6.0  20.0
Thailand  6.0  47.0  10.0  15.7  21.3
30% cut-off
Hong Kong  40.0  46.0  2.0  0.0  12.0
Indonesia  26.0  54.0  2.0  0.0  18.0
Japan  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Korea  86.0  0.0  4.0  0.0  10.0
Malaysia  92.0  6.0  2.0  0.0  0.0
Philippines  60.0  20.0  0.0  6.0  14.0
Singapore  74.0  8.0  18.0  0.0  0.0
Taiwan  92.0  4.0  0.0  0.0  4.0
Thailand  44.0  25.0  12.0  10.0  9.0
40% cut-off
Hong  Kong  68.0  22.0  0.0  0.0  10.0
Indonesia  56.0  30.0  0.0  0.0  14.0
Japan  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Korea  92.0  0.0  4.0  0.0  4.0
Malaysia  98.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Philippines  86.0  6.0  0.0  4.0  4.0
Singapore  88.0  6.0  6.0  0.0  0.0
Taiwan  98.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Thailand  78.0  8.0  10.0  2.0  2.0
39Table A3:  Control of the Smallest Fifty Publicly Traded Companies
Newly-assembled  data for 2,980 publicly-traded  corporations  (including  both financial institutions  and
non-financial  institutions)  are collected  from Worldscope,  the Asian  Company  Handbook  1999  (1998),  the
Japan Company  Handbook 1999 (1998), the 1997 Annual Reports of the Hong Kong, Jakarta, Seoul,
Kuala Lumpur,  and Manila Stock Exchanges,  as well as with ownership  data from the Korean Fair Trade
Conmmission,  the Securities  Exchange  of Thailand  Companies  Handbook  (1998), the Singapore  Investrnent
Guide (1998) and IFR Handbook  of World Stock and Conmnodity  Exchanges  (1997). In all cases, we
collect  the ownership  structure  as of Decemnber  1996  or the end of the 1996  accounting  year.  Unweighted.
Country  Widely  Held  Family  State  Widely  Held  Widely  Held
Financial  Corporation
10%  cut-off
Hong  Kong  4.0  60.7  3.0  1.0  31.3
Indonesia  0.0  88.0  0.0  2.0  10.0
Japan  1.0  52.0  0.0  30.0  17.0
Korea  1.0  91.3  0.0  3.0  4.7
Malaysia  1.0  63.2  9.3  15.7  10.8
Philippines  2.0  34.0  1.0  13.7  49.3
Singapore  0.0  58.3  9.3  11.7  20.7
Taiwan  0.0  82.7  0.0  7.0  10.3
Thailand  1.3  55.0  2.3  19.7  21.7
20% cut-off
Hong Kong  14.0  57.0  3.0  1.0  25.0
Indonesia  0.0  93.0  0.0  1.0  6.0
Japan  0.0  57.0  0.0  30.0  13.0
Korea  0.0  97.0  0.0  1.0  2.0
Malaysia  0.0  84.0  5.0  2.0  9.0
Philippines  16.0  45.0  2.0  6.0  31.0
Singapore  2.0  67.0  4.0  5.0  22.0
Taiwan  6.0  80.0  0.0  4.0  10.0
Thailand  0.0  76.7  2.7  5.0  15.7
30%  cut-off
Hong  Kong  54.0  26.0  2.0  0.0  18.0
Indonesia  14.0  83.0  0.0  0.0  3.0
Japan  62.0  30.0  0.0  0.0  8.0
Korea  18.0  80.0  0.0  0.0  2.0
Malaysia  6.0  80.0  2.0  2.0  10.0
Philippines  64.0  13.0  2.0  4.0  17.0
Singapore  8.0  62.0  4.0  4.0  22.0
Taiwan  54.0  40.0  0.0  2.0  4.0
Thailand  0.0  81.0  2.0  2.0  15.0
40%  cut-off
Hong Kong  76.0  16.0  2.0  0.0  6.0
Indonesia  48.0  52.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Japan  98.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0
Korea  82.0  18.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Malaysia  50.0  42.0  2.0  0.0  6.0
Philippines  82.0  8.0  0.0  0.0  10.0
Singapore  24.0  48.0  4.0  4.0  20.0
Taiwan  88.0  12.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Thailand  10.0  72.0  2.0  2.0  14.0
40Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2034  Information, Accounting, and the  Phil Burns  December 1998  G. Chenet-Smith
Regulation of Concessioned  Antonio Estache  36370
Infrastructure Monopolies
WPS2035  Macroeconomic  Uncertainty and  Luis Serven  December 1998  H. Varaas
Private Investment in Developing  38546
Countries: An Empirical  Investigation
WPS2036  Vehicles, Roads, and Road Use:  Gregory K. Ingram  December 1998  J.  Ponchamni
Alternative Empirical Specifications  Zhi Liu  31022
WPS2037  Financial Regulation and  James R. Barth  January 1999  A. Yaptenco
Performance: Cross-Country  Gerard Caprio, Jr.  38526
Evidence  Ross Levine
WPS2038  Good Governance and Trade Policy:  Francis Ng  January 1999  L. Tabada
Are They the Keys to Africa's Global  Alexander Yeats  36896
Integration and Growth?
WPS2039  Reforming Institutions for Service  Navin Girishankar  January 1999  B. Casely-Hayford
Delivery: A Framework for Development  34672
Assistance with an Application to the
health, Nutrition, and Population
Portfolio
WPS2040  Making Negotiated Land Reform  Klaus Deininger  January 1999  M. Fernandez
Work:  Initial Experience from  33766
Brazil, Colombia,  and South Africa
WPS2041  Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction  Paul Collier  January 1999  E. Khine
David Dollar  37471
WPS2042  Determinants of Motorization and  Gregory K. Ingram  January 1999  J. Ponchamni
Road Provision  Zhi Liu  31022
PWS2043  Demand for Public Safety  Menno Pradhan  january  1999  P. Sader
Martin Ravallion  33902
WPS2044  Trade, Migration, and Welfare:  Maurice Schiff  January 1999  L. Tabada
The Impact of Social Capital  36896
WPS2045  Water Challenge and Institutional  R. Maria Saleth  January 199g  Toppin
Response (A Cross-Country  Ariel Dinar  30450
Perspective)
WPS2046  Restructuring of Insider-Dominated  Simeon Djankov  Janua,  1999  R. 'Vo
Firms  33722
WPS2047  Ownership Structure and Enterprise  Simeon Djankov  February  lGg9  R, `dn
Restructuring in Six Newly  335
independent StatesPolicy  Research  Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  p  :. pe
WPS2048  Corruption in Economic  Shang-Jin Wei  February 1999  C. Bernardo
Development: Beneficial Grease,  31148
Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?
WPS2049  Household Labor Supply,  Kaushik Basu  February 1999  M. Mason
Unemployment, and Minimum Wage  Garance Genicot  30809
Legislation  Joseph E. Stiglitz
WPS2050  Measuring Aid Flows: A New  Charles C. Chang.  February 1999  E. K￿hine
Approach  Eduardo Fernandez-Arias  37471
Luis Serven
WPS2051  How Stronger Protection of  Carsten Fink  February 1999  L. W.llems
Intellectual Property Rights Affects  Carlos A. Primo Braga  85153
International Trade Flows
WPS2052  The Macro Wage  Curve and Labor  Dorte Verner  February 1999  H. Vargas
Market Flexibility in Zimbabwe  3787  1
WPS2053  Managing Foreign Labor in Singapore Elizabeth Ruppert  February 1999  A. Sperlin
And Malaysia: Are There Lessons for  37079
GCC Countries?